Repost:
Checked, the armament is accurate, but I still don't see the spherical type of front turrest like in the game, only a horizontal observation.
Luckyly I got a book to pull numbers from: Convoi war by Martine Middlebrook
I don't have info on the pacific.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
1939
numbers refer to ships over 1000 BRT (sea worthy)
GB 2965 17524000 BRT 190000 men; will receive 700 ships from fallen countries & swede (259 1040000 BRT) =3 MBRT
US 1409 8506000 BRT
G 713 3762000 BRT 46 active subs sunk 222 ships; 37 subs constructed
J 1054 5030000 BRT
Canadian Navy 6 warships; Sydney&Halifax assembling port
GB Sunderland aircraft
convoi tactic reduces BRT effectively down to 2/3
ASDIC, depth charges, RAF coastal command available
escort 200 sm into Atlantic
september night attack tactic
1940
G april 32 active subs
G june +26 italien subs;
G september 28 active subs wolfpack strategy
june-october 274 ships sunk 1.4 MBRT (133 sunk 700000 BRT by 4 aces)
about same number of ships lost to other causes
total 1281 ships sunk 4747033 BRT
1941
March US 3 destroyer sqr 5 aircraft sqr for west atlantic patrol, still neutral
May: continuing escort across the Atlantic by canada, GB, + later US (october entered war)
Soviet enters war
Radar available makes detecting surface+night subs possible
432 ships sunk 2+MBRT; 32 subs sunk (27 by GB escorts)
GB abandons Atlantic patrols
1942
US not applying GB strategy of escorts
radio direction finder available, uses wolfpack weakness
continuous contingent of 8 subs(6 attack 2 tankers) close to US thanks to sub tankers
May: 362 ships sunk BRT>1941
US adopts GB strategy; G subs move to Caribean, Brasilian coast
US takes command of west atlantic; NY becomes assembling port; BRT effectively reduced further by delays & Operation Torch
october: 196 active subs (nearly doubled to begin of the year)
allies begin bombing sub bases; 100 bombers lost (50% US)
another 575 ships sunk 3 MBRT
total 1160 ships sunk 6+ MBRT + 1.5 MBRT by others; 66 subs sunk majority by aircraft
total lost until now 14 MBRT; half replaced
Liberty ships introduced (2751 produced , about 200 sunk)
1943 turning point
GB escort force 30 destroyer 70 corvettes in 7 groups
Canada escort force 5 groups
US reserves only (5 cutters, etc)
G nearly only newbie sub crewmen (all veterans died); surface ships practically grounded
200 active subs in 8 fleets ; 5 subs per week produced
B-24 Liberator longrange aircraft available
B-17 Flying Fortress 2 sqr
GB new convoi formation doubling escorted ships from 30 to 64 (sometimes 80)
all british ships have one big gun
1944
GB 24000 marines, 14000 grunts on ships
------------------------------------------------
My numbers show the accurate situation at any time not the total as yours.
As you can see above the number of german subs peaks in 1942. US forces got active when aircrafts have become available everywhere, at which point it's practical game over for the subs.
Compared to the germans the US subs were bad. The total performance just equals that of one year of 30-40 german subs while the US had 200+ subs at the end. (at compareable japanese naval strength)
Yes US blocking was more effective due to two factors:
1. more units
2. lots of islands and carriers, not much gaps due to range
lol
I think the US pilots just got nothing else to shoot at at the time. The japanese only defended their islands which were only supplied by subs after they pulled back all their transport ships closer to home.
People have been pointing out the strange japanese behaviour of taking risks and misplaced cautiousness. But IMHO that's because of their limited resources and no confidence to have them available for the fight at hand.
Almael wrote:I meant the Catalina. Especially the aft gun mountLt. Schwenkdawg wrote:
And
Almael, the black cat aircraft weren't over-weaponized. The Black Cats'
main mission was convoy attack, with a secondary objective of rescue.
The PBY Catalina (the aircraft used) was originally built as a
reconnissance aircraft, but actually was well-suited to a convoy attack
role against lightly armed and armored japanese transports.
Overall,
although you dont read about it nearly as much, the US ran the most
successful commerce war in history, which is contrary to the belief
that the German U-boats were the most successful commerce
raiders.
seem added. I don't remember seeing a front turret either on actual
crafts, but will check later.
That depends on the view point. WW2 only.
1.The allies had 5000-7000 transporters(5000 british) at any given time.
The
germans had 20-50 subs at any given time. Even all out the germans
wouldn't be able to sink all ships. However, they could effectivly
block the supply line.
2. In the heat of the convoy war the US only
escorted ships half the way (the safe side) while the British did the
dangerous part.
3. By the time the US took more action, radar and aircraft were already deployed and the war was already a onesided sub-hunt.
If anything or anyone it was the corvettes and the new convoy tactics that won the sub-war.
As to the japanese:
After
Midway, they practically had no navy left, and their transport capacity
was not worth mentioning. Destroying them with aircraft was easy. The
US Navy had 110 aircraft carriers at the end of the war. Overall
tousands of aircrafts against some (100) transporters.
The reason why it's not so known is because it's not interesting and not worth mentioning.
Edit:
Japanese transports: 6 Kyuryokan (supply) 6 Kyuheikan (ammunition) 1 Asahi (repair)
8 hospital ships
...do they actually have a commerce fleet?
By
numbers axies forces were peanuts compared to eg. 6000 ships in Op.
Overlord (Normandy) and 5000 ships in Pacific Operations.
Lt.
Schwenkdawg wrote:No. All catalinas were built with a forward facing turret.
as for the belly turret...i wouldnt be surprised, but i dont know. And
as for the commerce war, youre looking at all the wrong numbers.
Pre-war, the japanese merchant fleet was about 5.8 million tons of
shipping. For a loss of ONLY 42 boats, the US submarine force sank 4
million tons of this, or about 2/3. The allied merchant marine lost 14
million tons of shipping, BUT although it is a bigger number, it only
adds up to roughly 54% of total tonnage avalible for transport to the
merchant navy AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR (once the united states
entered the war, it was putting out a frankly irresponsible amount of
merchant tonnage per year that completely made up for any losses
sustained by the u-boat fleet). For this number, the u-boats lost an
astonishing 783 of their own boats. You also have to remember that the
german boats were fighting against an industrial juggernaut (the united
states launched roughly 11 million tons of merchant shipping in 1943
ALONE), while the japanese managed MAYBE 200,000 a year. Overall, the
US air and sea blockade of the empire of japan was far more successful
than the attempted german blockade of england. (although you are
correct on some terms. Japanese naval planners, and naval officers, saw
convoy escort duty as dishonorable, and wished only to be engaged in
the decisive battle against the US batle line...which was never to
come. Therefore, while the british and americans had EXTENSIVE ASW
experience and technology, and put it to good use starting in 1943-ish,
the japanese never did...and got played on for it) Oh, and convoy
tactics weren't new. The only new part of WW2 era convoy systems was
the technology...the tactics had remained essentially unchanged from
the first world war...when the british had the same problem...
For
your comment about the japanese navy, it wasnt the loss of the carriers
that crippled the IJN, it was the loss of the pilots on the carriers.
Japanese naval aviators underwent much longer and more strenuous
training periods than their allied counterparts did (germany had no
naval aviators to speak of, so there is no comparison there).
Therefore, at the beginning of the war, japan had a small cadre of
extremely skilled pilots, while america had a slew of mediocre to okay
pilots. But, attrition, along with the aging of the A6M Zero design in
comparison to contemporary allied designs and tactics (the thatch weave
was a particularly effective anti-zero tactic), started wearing away at
this cadre, and Midway essentially put the nail in the coffin. The
system in place for training japanese pilots simply couldnt account for
the losses in men and aircraft suffered in the war, and therefore,
japanese air power sharply declined. And, as i'm sure you well know,
air power defined the pacific war. So, japan actually had a significant
amount of naval power left after midway, but they had no pilots, no
fuel, and they were running out of metal. Oh, and carrier-based fighter
groups were rarely used to attack convoys (until late war, when there
really wasnt much else to attack), as US carriers were deployed in task
forces, and sending an incredibly powerful force like this to hunt
convoys was a waste of time.
Checked, the armament is accurate, but I still don't see the spherical type of front turrest like in the game, only a horizontal observation.
Luckyly I got a book to pull numbers from: Convoi war by Martine Middlebrook
I don't have info on the pacific.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
1939
numbers refer to ships over 1000 BRT (sea worthy)
GB 2965 17524000 BRT 190000 men; will receive 700 ships from fallen countries & swede (259 1040000 BRT) =3 MBRT
US 1409 8506000 BRT
G 713 3762000 BRT 46 active subs sunk 222 ships; 37 subs constructed
J 1054 5030000 BRT
Canadian Navy 6 warships; Sydney&Halifax assembling port
GB Sunderland aircraft
convoi tactic reduces BRT effectively down to 2/3
ASDIC, depth charges, RAF coastal command available
escort 200 sm into Atlantic
september night attack tactic
1940
G april 32 active subs
G june +26 italien subs;
G september 28 active subs wolfpack strategy
june-october 274 ships sunk 1.4 MBRT (133 sunk 700000 BRT by 4 aces)
about same number of ships lost to other causes
total 1281 ships sunk 4747033 BRT
1941
March US 3 destroyer sqr 5 aircraft sqr for west atlantic patrol, still neutral
May: continuing escort across the Atlantic by canada, GB, + later US (october entered war)
Soviet enters war
Radar available makes detecting surface+night subs possible
432 ships sunk 2+MBRT; 32 subs sunk (27 by GB escorts)
GB abandons Atlantic patrols
1942
US not applying GB strategy of escorts
radio direction finder available, uses wolfpack weakness
continuous contingent of 8 subs(6 attack 2 tankers) close to US thanks to sub tankers
May: 362 ships sunk BRT>1941
US adopts GB strategy; G subs move to Caribean, Brasilian coast
US takes command of west atlantic; NY becomes assembling port; BRT effectively reduced further by delays & Operation Torch
october: 196 active subs (nearly doubled to begin of the year)
allies begin bombing sub bases; 100 bombers lost (50% US)
another 575 ships sunk 3 MBRT
total 1160 ships sunk 6+ MBRT + 1.5 MBRT by others; 66 subs sunk majority by aircraft
total lost until now 14 MBRT; half replaced
Liberty ships introduced (2751 produced , about 200 sunk)
1943 turning point
GB escort force 30 destroyer 70 corvettes in 7 groups
Canada escort force 5 groups
US reserves only (5 cutters, etc)
G nearly only newbie sub crewmen (all veterans died); surface ships practically grounded
200 active subs in 8 fleets ; 5 subs per week produced
B-24 Liberator longrange aircraft available
B-17 Flying Fortress 2 sqr
GB new convoi formation doubling escorted ships from 30 to 64 (sometimes 80)
all british ships have one big gun
1944
GB 24000 marines, 14000 grunts on ships
------------------------------------------------
My numbers show the accurate situation at any time not the total as yours.
As you can see above the number of german subs peaks in 1942. US forces got active when aircrafts have become available everywhere, at which point it's practical game over for the subs.
Compared to the germans the US subs were bad. The total performance just equals that of one year of 30-40 german subs while the US had 200+ subs at the end. (at compareable japanese naval strength)
Yes US blocking was more effective due to two factors:
1. more units
2. lots of islands and carriers, not much gaps due to range
lol
I think the US pilots just got nothing else to shoot at at the time. The japanese only defended their islands which were only supplied by subs after they pulled back all their transport ships closer to home.
People have been pointing out the strange japanese behaviour of taking risks and misplaced cautiousness. But IMHO that's because of their limited resources and no confidence to have them available for the fight at hand.